Automated Organization ProfileUNC - Chapel Hill
UNC - Chapel Hill
Current S-Index
Sum of Dataset Indices for all datasets
Average Dataset Index per Dataset
Average Dataset Index per dataset
Total Datasets
Total datasets in this organization
Average FAIR Score
Average FAIR Score per dataset
Total Citations
Total citations to the organization's datasets
Total Mentions
Total mentions of the organization's datasets
S-Index Interpretation
The S-Index (Sharing Index) is a comprehensive metric that represents the cumulative impact of all your datasets. It is calculated as the sum of Dataset Index scores across all your claimed datasets.
What it means:
- A higher S-index indicates greater overall impact of your datasets relative to typical datasets in their fields of research
- The S-Index grows as you add more datasets or as existing datasets gain more citations and mentions
- It provides a single number to track your research data impact over time
Current S-Index: 5.8 (sum of 16 datasets Dataset Index scores)
More information here.
S-Index Over Time
Cumulative Citations Over Time
Cumulative Mentions Over Time
Datasets
Includes Stata data and do files to replicate the statistical tests in the main manuscript and the appendix of the article "Local Norms, Political Partisanship, and Pandemic Response: Evidence from the US."
Authors
- Lipsitz, Keena ;
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore ;
- Robertson, Graeme
No description available
Authors
- Hicks, Leslie
This archive contains the data and scripts necessary to replicate the analyses in "Demolition and Discontent: Governing the Authoritarian City"
Authors
- Norton, Sean
The presence of large cities increases the probability of authoritarian breakdown, but the literature has offered little empirical insight as to how challenges to authoritarian rule develop in urban space. I develop a theory of cities as complex socio-political spaces that are difficult to govern, particularly in the absence of democratic institutions. This complexity makes both cooptation and coercion difficult, meaning the very tactics that authoritarian cities use to control discontent can become its proximate cause. Using a large, city-financed housing project in Moscow targeted at rewarding regime supporters, I utilize a Bayesian semi-parametric model to demonstrate that even a seemingly well-targeted cooptive exchange contributed to a surprising defeat for the regime in a subsequent municipal election. My results suggest that the relative illegibility of cities plays an important part in the development of opposition to authoritarian rule.
Authors
- Norton, Sean T.
No description available
Authors
- Hicks, Leslie M.
No description available
Authors
- Hicks, Leslie
:unav
Authors
- Martin, Lucy
:unav
Authors
- Martin, Lucy
:unav
Authors
- Martin, Lucy
Despite corruption’s effects on citizen welfare, there is substantial variation in when citizens are willing to sanction government wrongdoing. This paper uses a conjoint survey experiment, conducted in Uganda, to test how information about the position a corrupt official holds, and the details of an act of embezzlement, affect citizens’ perceptions of corruption severity and willingness to punish. I find that the revenue source of stolen funds and the sector to which the funds had been allocated have the largest impact on perceived severity, followed by whether stolen funds are spent privately or recirculated through patronage or clientelism. The position the corrupt official holds has a smaller impact on severity, including whether the official was elected and whether he was a central or local official.
Authors
- Martin, Lucy