Which factors determine how individuals utilize advice? Previous research focused on either the consensus or the proximity of advice. We develop a general account of advice taking, arguing that both consensus and proximity influence the consistency (or variance) of the information on hand. From this account, we derive a number of predictions regarding the effects of consensus, distance, and amount of advice on confidence, judgment revision, and advice weighting. Across three experiments, we orthogonally manipulated the distance and consensus of advice. The amount of advice was either measured (Experiments 1 and 2) or manipulated (Experiment 3). The results provide strong support for our consistency account of advice taking. It allows explaining a complex pattern of findings that neither consensus nor proximity alone can account for. This research advances our theoretical understanding of advice taking, while adding to a broader literature that highlights the importance of consistency of information for judgment and decision making.

Which factors determine how individuals utilize advice? Previous research focused on either the consensus or the proximity of advice. We develop a general account of advice taking, arguing that both consensus and proximity influence the consistency (or variance) of the information on hand. From this account, we derive a number of predictions regarding the effects of consensus, distance, and amount of advice on confidence, judgment revision, and advice weighting. Across three experiments, we orthogonally manipulated the distance and consensus of advice. The amount of advice was either measured (Experiments 1 and 2) or manipulated (Experiment 3). The results provide strong support for our consistency account of advice taking. It allows explaining a complex pattern of findings that neither consensus nor proximity alone can account for. This research advances our theoretical understanding of advice taking, while adding to a broader literature that highlights the importance of consistency of information for judgment and decision making.

Much advice taking research investigates whether advice weighting accords to normative principles for maximizing decision accuracy. The present research complements this normative perspective with an interpersonal one, arguing that judges should also pay attention to how much their advisors want them to weight advice. In four experiments, we found that advisors do not always want their advice to be adopted fully. Instead, they often give advice about which they are uncertain and therefore want their advice to be averaged with judges’ initial opinions or not used at all. Furthermore, advisors’ desired advice weighting is often congruent with the judges’ actual weighting, but moderators that affect advisor or judge confidence can cause desired and actual weighting to diverge (Experiments 1 and 2). When tasks were difficult, judges put more weight on the advice than advisors desired, because increasing the difficulty of the task led advisors to want their advice weighted less, whereas judges placed more weight on the advice. The reverse was true for easy tasks (Experiment 2). Importantly, both weighting more and less than advisors desired caused advisors to evaluate judges more negatively, which resulted in reduced willingness to give advice again in the future (Experiments 3 and 4), indicating that advisors want their advice used, but not too much.

Much advice taking research investigates whether advice weighting accords to normative principles for maximizing decision accuracy. The present research complements this normative perspective with an interpersonal one, arguing that judges should also pay attention to how much their advisors want them to weight advice. In four experiments, we found that advisors do not always want their advice to be adopted fully. Instead, they often give advice about which they are uncertain and therefore want their advice to be averaged with judges’ initial opinions or not used at all. Furthermore, advisors’ desired advice weighting is often congruent with the judges’ actual weighting, but moderators that affect advisor or judge confidence can cause desired and actual weighting to diverge (Experiments 1 and 2). When tasks were difficult, judges put more weight on the advice than advisors desired, because increasing the difficulty of the task led advisors to want their advice weighted less, whereas judges placed more weight on the advice. The reverse was true for easy tasks (Experiment 2). Importantly, both weighting more and less than advisors desired caused advisors to evaluate judges more negatively, which resulted in reduced willingness to give advice again in the future (Experiments 3 and 4), indicating that advisors want their advice used, but not too much.

Which factors determine how individuals utilize advice? Previous research focused on either the consensus or the proximity of advice. We develop a general account of advice taking, arguing that both consensus and proximity influence the consistency (or variance) of the information on hand. From this account, we derive a number of predictions regarding the effects of consensus, distance, and amount of advice on confidence gains, judgment revision, and advice weighting. In two experiments, we manipulated advice distance continuously and consensus orthogonally to distance, while observing the amount of advice that individuals sampled. The results provide strong support for our consistency account of advice taking. It allows explaining a complex pattern of findings that neither consensus nor proximity alone can account for. This research advances our theoretical understanding of advice taking, while adding to a broader literature that highlights the importance of consistency of information for judgment and decision making.

A major module of rational advice taking consists in the metacognitive ability to distinguish between credible advice and arbitrary anchors. Accordingly, we investigated the extent to which framing the very same information as either advice or anchor exerts a differential influence on quantitative judgments. Four experiments showed that although arbitrary anchors were given lower weight than advice, they nevertheless exerted a systematic impact on final judgments. Degree of integration was related to subjective confidence only in the advice condition, but not in the anchoring condition, suggesting that arbitrary anchors were not considered informative. Framing the source of advice as a human being versus as a computer did not affect our results. Only the aboutness of advice, that is, whether it targeted the focal judgment item, determined its influence on final judgments and on confidence. On the one hand, these findings speak to the (partial) sensitivity of human judges to the source and validity of advice under uncertainty. On the other hand, the persevering effect of arbitrary anchors demonstrates the dependence of judgments on unauthorized influences. Both findings together highlight the need to study advice taking from a metacognitive perspective.

A major module of rational advice taking consists in the metacognitive ability to distinguish between credible advice and arbitrary anchors. Accordingly, we investigated the extent to which framing the very same information as either advice or anchor exerts a differential influence on quantitative judgments. Four experiments showed that although arbitrary anchors were given lower weight than advice, they nevertheless exerted a systematic impact on final judgments. Degree of integration was related to subjective confidence only in the advice condition, but not in the anchoring condition, suggesting that arbitrary anchors were not considered informative. Framing the source of advice as a human being versus as a computer did not affect our results. Only the aboutness of advice, that is, whether it targeted the focal judgment item, determined its influence on final judgments and on confidence. On the one hand, these findings speak to the (partial) sensitivity of human judges to the source and validity of advice under uncertainty. On the other hand, the persevering effect of arbitrary anchors demonstrates the dependence of judgments on unauthorized influences. Both findings together highlight the need to study advice taking from a metacognitive perspective.

Previous research has shown that approaching a stimulus makes it more positive, while avoiding a stimulus makes it more negative. The present research demonstrates that approach-avoidance behaviors have the potential to charge stimulus attributes such as color with evaluative meaning. This evaluation carries over to other stimuli with that feature. We address the latter point by assessing the influence of colors that were approached or avoided on the perceived attractiveness of persons wearing those colors. We show that wearing a certain color makes people appear more attractive when this color is associated with approach rather than avoidance. In line with a self-perception account of these effects, we obtained approach-avoidance effects on stimulus attributes only when participants carried out approach-avoidance behaviors towards these colors or imagined doing so. This set of experiments adds to the evaluative learning literature by demonstrating approach-avoidance effects on stimulus attributes and that these effects carry over to new classes of stimuli and new tasks. Moreover, we systematically investigated boundary conditions for these effects. Finally, with this research we introduce an ontogenetic perspective to research into colors and their influence on psychological functioning.

Previous research has shown that approaching a stimulus makes it more positive, while avoiding a stimulus makes it more negative. The present research demonstrates that approach-avoidance behaviors have the potential to charge stimulus attributes such as color with evaluative meaning. This evaluation carries over to other stimuli with that feature. We address the latter point by assessing the influence of colors that were approached or avoided on the perceived attractiveness of persons wearing those colors. We show that wearing a certain color makes people appear more attractive when this color is associated with approach rather than avoidance. In line with a self-perception account of these effects, we obtained approach-avoidance effects on stimulus attributes only when participants carried out approach-avoidance behaviors towards these colors or imagined doing so. This set of experiments adds to the evaluative learning literature by demonstrating approach-avoidance effects on stimulus attributes and that these effects carry over to new classes of stimuli and new tasks. Moreover, we systematically investigated boundary conditions for these effects. Finally, with this research we introduce an ontogenetic perspective to research into colors and their influence on psychological functioning.

Previous research has shown that approaching a stimulus makes it more positive, while avoiding a stimulus makes it more negative. The present research demonstrates that approach-avoidance behaviors have the potential to charge stimulus attributes such as color with evaluative meaning. This evaluation carries over to other stimuli with that feature. We address the latter point by assessing the influence of colors that were approached or avoided on the perceived attractiveness of persons wearing those colors. We show that wearing a certain color makes people appear more attractive when this color is associated with approach rather than avoidance. In line with a self-perception account of these effects, we obtained approach-avoidance effects on stimulus attributes only when participants carried out approach-avoidance behaviors towards these colors or imagined doing so. This set of experiments adds to the evaluative learning literature by demonstrating approach-avoidance effects on stimulus attributes and that these effects carry over to new classes of stimuli and new tasks. Moreover, we systematically investigated boundary conditions for these effects. Finally, with this research we introduce an ontogenetic perspective to research into colors and their influence on psychological functioning.