Automated Author Profile

Craig, Alison

University of Texas at Austin

Current S-Index

1.0

Sum of Dataset Indices for all datasets

Average Dataset Index per Dataset

0.3

Average Dataset Index per dataset

Total Datasets

3

Total datasets for this author

Average FAIR Score

15.4%

Average FAIR Score per dataset

Total Citations

2

Total citations to the author's datasets

Total Mentions

0

Total mentions of the author's datasets

S-Index Interpretation

S-Index Over Time

Cumulative Citations Over Time

Cumulative Mentions Over Time

Datasets

Replication Data for: Governing Through Gridlock: Bill Composition under Divided Government

What is the effect of divided government on issue attention in state legislatures? Much of the research on the effects of divided government examines how it affects the enactment of significant legislation but does not consider other effects on legislative behavior. In this paper, I propose a new theory of the relationship between divided government and legislative activity. Regardless of partisan control, reelection-minded legislators face pressure to deliver benefits to voters, yet divided government can make substantive policy change difficult. As a result of these competing pressures, under divided government legislators increasingly turn their focus to bills that benefit their local constituents, which are seen as easier to enact and allow them to engage in advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. I find that under divided government, legislators introduce bills at the same rate, but the type of legislation introduced shifts away from statewide policy changes and towards district-specific legislation.

Authors

  • Craig, Alison
1 Citation0 Mentions15% FAIR0.5 Dataset Index
10.15139/s3/nvoyh52023

Replication Data for: It Takes A Coalition: The Community Impacts of Collaboration (Version: 1.0)

Replication data and code for "It Takes A Coalition: The Community Impacts of Collaboration"

Authors

  • Craig, Alison
0 Citations0 Mentions15% FAIR0.1 Dataset Index
10.7910/dvn/rpapdb2020

Replication Data for: Cue-Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters (Version: 1.1)

Why do some pieces of legislation move forward while others languish? We address this fundamental question by examining the role of interest groups in Congress, specifically the effect of their legislative endorsements in Dear Colleague letters. These letters provide insights into the information that members use to both influence and make policy decisions. We demonstrate that endorsements from particularly well-connected interest groups are a strong cue for members with limited information early in the legislative process and help grow the list of bill cosponsors. As bills progress, such groups have less direct weight, while legislation supported by a larger number of organizations and a larger number of cosponsors is more likely to pass. Thus, we illuminate the usage of Dear Colleague letters in Congress, demonstrate how members use interest groups in the legislative process, and shed new light on the varying impact of groups on public policy.

Authors

  • Box-Steffensmeier, Janet ;
  • Christenson, Dino ;
  • Craig, Alison
1 Citation0 Mentions15% FAIR0.4 Dataset Index
10.7910/dvn/jneqyj2018