Automated Author ProfileMatschke, Xenia
Matschke, Xenia
Current S-Index
Sum of Dataset Indices for all datasets
Average Dataset Index per Dataset
Average Dataset Index per dataset
Total Datasets
Total datasets for this author
Average FAIR Score
Average FAIR Score per dataset
Total Citations
Total citations to the author's datasets
Total Mentions
Total mentions of the author's datasets
S-Index Interpretation
The S-Index (Sharing Index) is a comprehensive metric that represents the cumulative impact of all your datasets. It is calculated as the sum of Dataset Index scores across all your claimed datasets.
What it means:
- A higher S-index indicates greater overall impact of your datasets relative to typical datasets in their fields of research
- The S-Index grows as you add more datasets or as existing datasets gain more citations and mentions
- It provides a single number to track your research data impact over time
Current S-Index: 3.8 (sum of 2 datasets Dataset Index scores)
More information here.
S-Index Over Time
Cumulative Citations Over Time
Cumulative Mentions Over Time
Datasets
Some recent empirical studies, motivated by Grossman and Helpman's (1994) "protection-for-sale" model, suggest that very few factors (none of them labor related) determine trade protection. This paper reexamines the roles that labor issues play in the determination of trade policy. We introduce collective bargaining, differences in inter industry labor mobility, and trade union lobbying into the protection-for-sale model, and show that the equilibrium protection rate in our model depends upon these labor market variables. We test our model predictions using data from U.S. manufacturing and find that labor market considerations do seem to matter for U.S. trade policy.
Authors
- Matschke, Xenia ;
- Sherlund, Shane M.
Some recent empirical studies, motivated by Grossman and Helpman's (1994) "protection-for-sale" model, suggest that very few factors (none of them labor related) determine trade protection. This paper reexamines the roles that labor issues play in the determination of trade policy. We introduce collective bargaining, differences in inter industry labor mobility, and trade union lobbying into the protection-for-sale model, and show that the equilibrium protection rate in our model depends upon these labor market variables. We test our model predictions using data from U.S. manufacturing and find that labor market considerations do seem to matter for U.S. trade policy.
Authors
- Matschke, Xenia ;
- Sherlund, Shane M.