Automated Author ProfileMorrison, Edward
Morrison, Edward
Current S-Index
Sum of Dataset Indices for all datasets
Average Dataset Index per Dataset
Average Dataset Index per dataset
Total Datasets
Total datasets for this author
Average FAIR Score
Average FAIR Score per dataset
Total Citations
Total citations to the author's datasets
Total Mentions
Total mentions of the author's datasets
S-Index Interpretation
The S-Index (Sharing Index) is a comprehensive metric that represents the cumulative impact of all your datasets. It is calculated as the sum of Dataset Index scores across all your claimed datasets.
What it means:
- A higher S-index indicates greater overall impact of your datasets relative to typical datasets in their fields of research
- The S-Index grows as you add more datasets or as existing datasets gain more citations and mentions
- It provides a single number to track your research data impact over time
Current S-Index: 3.7 (sum of 2 datasets Dataset Index scores)
More information here.
S-Index Over Time
Cumulative Citations Over Time
Cumulative Mentions Over Time
Datasets
We investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage modification programs. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in modification policy induced by settlement of U.S. state government lawsuits against Countrywide Financial Corporation, which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers. Using a difference-in-difference framework, we find that Countrywide's monthly delinquency rate increased more than 0.54 percentage points—a ten percent relative increase—immediately after the settlement's announcement. The estimated increase in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default otherwise. These results suggest that strategic behavior should be an important consideration in designing mortgage modification programs. (JEL D10, G21, G33, K00)
Authors
- Mayer, Christopher ;
- Morrison, Edward ;
- Piskorski, Tomasz ;
- Gupta, Arpit
We investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage modification programs. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in modification policy induced by settlement of U.S. state government lawsuits against Countrywide Financial Corporation, which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers. Using a difference-in-difference framework, we find that Countrywide's monthly delinquency rate increased more than 0.54 percentage points—a ten percent relative increase—immediately after the settlement's announcement. The estimated increase in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default otherwise. These results suggest that strategic behavior should be an important consideration in designing mortgage modification programs. (JEL D10, G21, G33, K00)
Authors
- Mayer, Christopher ;
- Morrison, Edward ;
- Piskorski, Tomasz ;
- Gupta, Arpit