Automated Author Profile

Engelberg, Joseph

Current S-Index

4.6

Sum of Dataset Indices for all datasets

Average Dataset Index per Dataset

1.2

Average Dataset Index per dataset

Total Datasets

4

Total datasets for this author

Average FAIR Score

42.3%

Average FAIR Score per dataset

Total Citations

2

Total citations to the author's datasets

Total Mentions

0

Total mentions of the author's datasets

S-Index Interpretation

S-Index Over Time

Cumulative Citations Over Time

Cumulative Mentions Over Time

Datasets

Replication Data/Code for: "The Partisanship of Financial Regulators" (Version: 1.0)

We analyze the partisanship of Commissioners at the SEC and Governors at the Federal Reserve Board. Using the language-based approach of Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (Econometrica 2019), we identify partisan phrases in Congress, such as “red tape” and “climate change,” and observe their usage among regulators. Although the Fed has remained relatively non-partisan throughout our sample period (1930-2019), we find that partisanship among SEC Commissioners rose recently to an all-time high, driven by more-partisan Commissioners replacing less-partisan ones. This recent partisanship at the SEC appears in both the language of new SEC rules and the voting behavior of SEC Commissioners.

Authors

  • Engelberg, Joseph ;
  • Henriksson, Matthew ;
  • Manela, Asaf ;
  • Williams, Jared
0 Citations0 Mentions15% FAIR0.4 Dataset Index
10.7910/dvn/utmicuJanuary 2023

Replication data for: Do Economists Swing for the Fences after Tenure? (Version: 1)

Using a sample of all academics who pass through top 50 economics and finance departments from 1996 through 2014, we study whether the granting of tenure leads faculty to pursue riskier ideas. We use the extreme tails of ex-post citations as our measure of risk and find that both the number of publications and the portion consisting of "home runs" peak at tenure and fall steadily for a decade thereafter. Similar patterns hold for faculty at elite (top 10) institutions and for faculty who take differing time to tenure. We find the opposite pattern among poorly cited publications: their numbers rise post-tenure.

Authors

  • Brogaard, Jonathan ;
  • Engelberg, Joseph ;
  • Van Wesep, Edward
1 Citation0 Mentions69% FAIR2.0 Dataset Index
10.3886/e114006v1January 2018

Replication data for: Do Economists Swing for the Fences after Tenure? (Version: V0)

Using a sample of all academics who pass through top 50 economics and finance departments from 1996 through 2014, we study whether the granting of tenure leads faculty to pursue riskier ideas. We use the extreme tails of ex-post citations as our measure of risk and find that both the number of publications and the portion consisting of "home runs" peak at tenure and fall steadily for a decade thereafter. Similar patterns hold for faculty at elite (top 10) institutions and for faculty who take differing time to tenure. We find the opposite pattern among poorly cited publications: their numbers rise post-tenure.

Authors

  • Brogaard, Jonathan ;
  • Engelberg, Joseph ;
  • Van Wesep, Edward
1 Citation0 Mentions69% FAIR1.8 Dataset Index
10.3886/e114006January 2018

Replication data for: Human Capital and the Supply of Religion (Version: 1.2)

Engelberg, Joseph, Fisman, Raymond, Hartzell, Jay C., and Parsons, Christopher A., (2016) "Human Capital and the Supply of Religion." Review of Economics and Statistics 98:3, 415-427.

Authors

  • Fisman, Raymond ;
  • Engelberg, Joseph ;
  • Hartzell, Jay C. ;
  • Parsons, Christopher A.
0 Citations0 Mentions15% FAIR0.4 Dataset Index
10.7910/dvn/mvf3yuJanuary 2016