Replication files for Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth (2021).

During the financial crisis of 2007-10, the Federal Reserve (Fed) served as a global lender of last resort by establishing currency swap agreements with 14 foreign central banks, including several in East Asia. These agreements were controversial internationally because the Fed selectively established swaps with some central banks and not others, raising concerns about access to the Fed’s dollar-creating facilities. Within the U.S. Congress, the swaps were controversial because they appeared to be a new and unauthorized form of foreign aid. I analyze both the Fed’s decision to establish swap lines with certain central banks and the congressional response to these arrangements. I find that the Fed was more likely to establish swaps with central banks whose jurisdictions were important to U.S. commercial banks, suggesting that the Fed discriminated in ways that served U.S. interests. To analyze the congressional reaction to the foreign currency swaps, I examine voting in the House of Representatives on a legislative proposal known as “Audit the Fed” that would end the Fed's confidentiality about the foreign central banks it supports and reduce its political independence more broadly. I find that campaign contributions from commercial banks to representatives are negatively correlated with voting “yes” on this proposal. I also find that right-wing representatives are much more likely to support this proposal than left-wing representatives, which suggests that new congressional coalitions are forming on the role of the Fed in the (global) economy.