A large literature finds that workers displaced in mass layoffs experience persistentearnings losses. We find that the earnings penalty from job displacement is mediatedby the length of the jobless spell after displacement. Workers who experience little orno joblessness suffer no losses on average; those who experience a prolonged period ofjoblessness experience large, persistent earnings losses. Job movers who experiencejoblessness tend to move to lower paying firms, a phenomenon which informs ourunderstanding of the mechanisms that generate earnings losses. We also find thatjobless duration predicts earnings outcomes for separators generally, not only displacedworkers.

A large literature finds that workers displaced in mass layoffs experience persistentearnings losses. We find that the earnings penalty from job displacement is mediatedby the length of the jobless spell after displacement. Workers who experience little orno joblessness suffer no losses on average; those who experience a prolonged period ofjoblessness experience large, persistent earnings losses. Job movers who experiencejoblessness tend to move to lower paying firms, a phenomenon which informs ourunderstanding of the mechanisms that generate earnings losses. We also find thatjobless duration predicts earnings outcomes for separators generally, not only displacedworkers.

Most of the rise in overall earnings inequality from 1996 to 2018 is accounted for by risingbetween-industry dispersion. The contribution of industries is right-skewed with the top ten percent of 4-digit NAICS industries dominating. The top ten percent are clustered in high-paying high-tech and low-paying retail sectors. In the top industries, high-wage workers are increasingly sorted to high-wage industries with rising industry premia. In the bottom industries, low-wage workers are increasingly sorted into low-wage industries, with rising employment and falling industry wage premia.

Most of the rise in overall earnings inequality from 1996 to 2018 is accounted for by risingbetween-industry dispersion. The contribution of industries is right-skewed with the top ten percent of 4-digit NAICS industries dominating. The top ten percent are clustered in high-paying high-tech and low-paying retail sectors. In the top industries, high-wage workers are increasingly sorted to high-wage industries with rising industry premia. In the bottom industries, low-wage workers are increasingly sorted into low-wage industries, with rising employment and falling industry wage premia.

We estimate the effects of house price changes on young-firm employment shares and industry-level employment growth in local economies. A novel test shows that house price effects on local economies work through wealth, liquidity and collateral effects on the propensity to start new firms and expand young ones. Aggregating local effects to the national level, our estimates imply that housing market ups and downs play a major role – as transmission channel and driving force – in medium-run fluctuations in young-firm employment shares in recent decades. We also find a distinct and smaller role for locally exogenous loan-supply shifts.

This paper studies the employment dynamics for firms that adopt advanced technologies versus firms that do not. The findings suggest that firms that adopt advanced technologies are different from those that do not in terms of their size and growth patterns. Prior to the time period during which the adoption of advanced technologies intensified, these firms were larger and grew faster. However, the adoption of advanced technologies did not lead to significant changes in their employment and growth patterns. These findings suggest that adoption is driven more by selection and have implications on how we assess the impacts of advanced technology adoption on firm performance.

Review of Economics and Statistics: Forthcoming.

We estimate the effects of house price changes on young-firm employment shares and industry-level employment growth in local economies. A novel test shows that house price effects on local economies work through wealth, liquidity and collateral effects on the propensity to start new firms and expand young ones. Aggregating local effects to the national level, our estimates imply that housing market ups and downs play a major role – as transmission channel and driving force – in medium-run fluctuations in young-firm employment shares in recent decades. We also find a distinct and smaller role for locally exogenous loan-supply shifts.

This paper studies the employment dynamics for firms that adopt advanced technologies versus firms that do not. The findings suggest that firms that adopt advanced technologies are different from those that do not in terms of their size and growth patterns. Prior to the time period during which the adoption of advanced technologies intensified, these firms were larger and grew faster. However, the adoption of advanced technologies did not lead to significant changes in their employment and growth patterns. These findings suggest that adoption is driven more by selection and have implications on how we assess the impacts of advanced technology adoption on firm performance.

We create a national-level longitudinal dataset to analyze how children’s participation in public and voucher-assisted housing affects age 26 earnings and adult incarceration. Naïve OLS estimates suggest that returns to subsidized housing participation are negative, but that relationship is driven by household selection into assisted housing. Household fixed-effects estimates indicate that additional years of public housing increase earnings by 6.2% for females and 6.1% for males, while voucher-assisted housing increases earnings by 4.8% for females and 2.7% for males. Childhood participation in assisted housing also reduces the likelihood of adult incarceration for all household race/ethnicity groups.