Replication Data for: The Political Economy of NGO Service Provision: Evidence from an Ancillary Field Experiment in Uganda

In developing countries, the share of basic services delivered by NGOs has grown dramatically due to increased receipt of aid and philanthropy. Many scholars and practitioners have worried that NGOs reduce reliance on government services, lowering demand for government provision and undermining political engagement. Others argue that NGOs prop-up poorly performing governments that receive undeserved credit for the production, allocation, or welfare effects of NGO services. Using original surveys and a randomized health intervention implemented parallel to a similar universal government program, I investigate the long-term effect of NGO provision on political attitudes and behavior. Access to NGO services increased preferences for NGO relative to government provision. However, political engagement and perceptions of government legitimacy were unaffected. Instead, the intervention generated political credit for the incumbent President. I find that citizens see NGOs as a resource controlled by powerful government actors, and they reward actors seen as responsible for allocation.